Attempts to influence interest rate benchmarks such as Libor and Euribor by procuring or providing false submissions to data collators are examples of misconduct or criminal behaviour that -contrary to general belief -may have taken place for some years before becoming widely-known during the period of stress in 2007-08 that began the global financial crisis.
Subsequent enquiries, litigation, trials and regulatory settlements have included accounts of conduct that disturbed not only popular opinion but senior commercial and regulatory figures who might have been expected to require ethical behaviour of those directly concerned. Misconduct and its apparent toleration accordingly contributed to a general loss of trust in the financial sector. Penalties and settlements have been repeatedly imposed on offending banks, although judicial proceedings and regulatory enforcement actions arising from benchmark misconduct are yet to conclude.
This article considers the neglect of interest benchmark misconduct before and since it became well known; why distinct forms of misconduct have been wrongly conflated in popular and official accounts and in judicial proceedings; whether a pervasive loss of trust caused by a perception of widespread misconduct has had lasting commercial or location-specific effects; and whether reforms intended to restore external confidence by substituting recorded transaction data for subjective estimates may revive functional concerns that interest benchmarks were created to remove.
Introduction
Revelations of benchmarking malpractice appearing during the 2007-08 financial crisis came to be described in popular and official accounts as so entrenched as to resemble accepted commercial practice, and arguably contributed to a general decline in the trust accorded to the financial sector. Misconduct in interest rate benchmarking is the most startling example, due both to the pervasive use of interest rate benchmarks in a variety of contracts and instruments, and an apparent locational association of Libor -the London Interbank Offered Rate -as the prototypical and most widely-used model. It can also be readily understood as deceitful and therefore rightfully punishable, compared to the more complex recklessness seen in other aspects of the crisis. regulators, and will have had some ostensible impact on the trust accorded to those actors, collectively or individually.
• From concern that misconduct involving collusion might be supported by clustering among intermediaries or their agents in substantive financial centres, especially when aided by faulty or complicit regulation. More specifically, if collusion is taken to be facilitated by -or even synonymous with -the cooperation among competitor firms that is instrumental to substantive transactional activity in such financial hubs, there may be grounds to prohibit certain customary forms of cooperation as unethical or deleterious to societal interests, even though in these instances supervisory conduct may also be remiss.
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• An alternative proposition is that if collusion has existed among intermediaries, rather than those individuals and agents shown to have engaged in misconduct for personal reward then trust among professional parties might be so diminished as to impede legitimate commercial activity, and to erode the positive externalities derived from clustering in financial centres, notwithstanding any separate competition concerns.
• From any association of misconduct with a single financial hub, most notably London as the centre of the Libor benchmarking process.
This article will propose conclusions as to these questions after considering misconduct in the Libor process and other interest benchmarks using similar models; whether banks chose to collude to facilitate misconduct; the substance of a locational locus in Libor; and the impact on financial activity of a general loss of trust in banks and other intermediaries resulting from these examples of misconduct. It will also examine whether reforms intended to restore external confidence and the functionality of interest rate setting by substituting recorded transaction data for subjective estimates may revive functional concerns that interest benchmarks were initially created to remove. The article will not examine how interest benchmark misconduct may have caused monetary costs or gains for unconnected parties. The scale of any such effects will never be known, being impossible to quantify due to the unknown nature of many millions of contracts that reference interest benchmarks, and because misconduct seems to have often taken place without success for the instigator or harming others, 4 regardless of a widespread perception of banks or bankers having profited from such corrupt practices. 3 See infra n.22 and accompanying text, and see text accompanying n.35. Substantive financial centres are taken to be those where contractual activity is devised and executed, and are contrasted with offshore centres that are largely domiciles for financial claims or express trust arrangements devised and organised from elsewhere, see P. Lejot, The Place of Law: Institutional Influences on Financial Sector Agglomeration and Location Choice (unpublished dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 2017), s.1.4.1. 4 The first enforcement actions for interest benchmark misconduct were brought against Barclays Bank in 2012 and led to fined settlements with US and UK regulators, the reports of which describe attempts to influence rate-setting taken from recorded exchanges between individual traders, rate submitters and inter-dealer brokers, but with no indication of the results, if any. The same approach is made in all such documents and court pleadings cited here. 5 an arrangement with two main objectives:
• Giving lenders in any single transaction net interest revenue at least equal to the loan's credit margin while avoiding interest basis and duration mismatches.
• Tying the borrower's interest obligations to prevailing money market deposit rates, which are assumed to be more uniform and readily-obtained than those for longer periods.
Rates were originally set by some or all lenders in each transaction according to provisions by which reporting banks would declare their respective costs of funding to an agent, which would inform the borrower of a simple or adjusted average rate. 6 The contractual provisions for interest rate determination became standardised in purpose by the mid-1970s although minor variations in wording persisted for several years among the many agreements using this rollover formula. 7 Bankers and drafting lawyers referred colloquially to 'Libor' as a compression of the words used in provisions for rate determination, 8 although it could not then have been described A further consideration is that estimates of the direct consequences of misconduct in improving a trader's or trading unit's results typically adopt the single-contract payoff approach of finance theory, and assume that any gain by one party is matched by its counterparty's loss. This is hazardous with financial derivatives -many more of which cite interest benchmarks than other contracts -since it neglects their predominant use as portfolio instruments rather than having singular purposes and outcomes. Thus in legal analysis:
[…] we cannot extrapolate that real contracts will always have a commercial winner and loser, because few users contemplate and enter a single contract to watch its isolated outcome. The derivative markets are not a zero sum game. 6 See Lascelles, op. cit. n.5 at 86. 7 There were disagreements in construction in the late-1970s as to whether 'offer' in a loan agreement's interest determination clause referred to a rate or deposit but the difference was immaterial for rate fixings. Slight variations in language resulting from idiosyncratic drafting vanished from around 1981 due to banks increasingly wishing to avoid impeding secondary loan transfer, especially given that drafting was effectively led by relatively few clustered law firms. Drafting convergence occurred so effectively as to include private bilateral loan contracts and internal funding arrangements, author's direct experience 1980-83. This evolution of private law was driven throughout by practical considerations. 8 Syndicated floating rate notes (FRNs) and floating-rate certificates of deposit (FRCDs) appeared from mid-1969 using identical accrual mechanisms to the first rollover loans. A May 1969 offering circular for the first public FRN issued by a subsidiary of US fund manager, Dreyfus Corporation, described rate formally as a single benchmark for any nominated period or currency. Sophisticated borrowers knew that their costs could vary between loans according to the composition of reporting groups, especially since certain lenders or those with particular domiciles faced funding premiums from time-to-time, and the harmonisation of national capital requirements was proposed by a committee hosted by the Bank for International Settlements only in 1987. 9 The solution adopted in 1986 to quell the disquiet of influential borrowers was to externalise a semi-public benchmark that all credit transactions could cite as a periodic base rate, relying on self-selecting panels of banks reporting rates to a disinterested data collator, the British Bankers' Association (BBA). Libor-setting, managed in London with its results used in many centres, then remained largely unchanged until it was shown in 2008 to be prone to manipulation and its collator far from disinterested.
10 Such benchmarks were pivotal to the international loan market's growth in providing a uniform, contractually simple means to determine and apportion costs between lenders and borrowers, and despite being the creation of loan and money market practice were used universally -though not exclusively -as reference rates for FRNs, FRCDs and many other unconnected contracts from the early-1980s, most prolifically with exchange-traded and other financial derivatives. That last factor largely explains the concern that benchmark misconduct was harmful to unconnected commercial parties, 11 and an unproven belief that it affected yields or costs respectively for retail investors and borrowers. 18 See D. Keenan, 'My thwarted attempt to tell of Libor shenanigans', Financial Times (27 July 2012). This is the only published witness account of its kind known to the author, and although much-cited in 2012 has never been corroborated or its wider assertions substantiated.
A former Tokyo employee of UBS and Citigroup convicted in 2015 in England of conspiracy to defraud through manipulating Yen Libor claimed in evidence that inter alia:
He was never trained in the Libor process and, in particular, as to what was or was not a legitimate consideration for a submitter to take into account in making a Libor submission; had no regulatory or compliance obligations imposed on him by either UBS or Citigroup; considered that what he was doing was common practice in the banking industry at the time and was regarded as legitimate by a significant number of submitters, traders and brokers; understood that the banks as a matter of practice based submissions on their own commercial interests; [h]is actions were not only condoned, but also encouraged by his employers and he was instructed to act in the way which he did. Barclays directed its US Dollar Libor submitters to lower their daily US Dollar LIBOR submissions in order to protect Barclays' reputation against what it believed were negative and unfair media and market perceptions that Barclays had a liquidity problem based in part on its high Libor submissions?
ibid., at 19, however the US Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) noted that it had 'not found evidence that Barclays lowered its LIBOR submissions in response to the management directive during the financial crisis period with the intent to affect the official published LIBOR', ibid., at n. believed misconduct to be of less concern than the threat of general instability, andcorrectly but arguably disingenuously -later professed that it lacked a formal remit to supervise this aspect of banking or BBA conduct. 23 In common with other central banks it had tacitly accepted the infeasibility of benchmark manipulation for individual profit. 24 The FSA arguably took a similar view until prompted by its more energetic US counterparts.
• Had been neglected by the BBA, whose conduct failed in its fiduciary obligation in compiling and reporting a reference that the BBA itself professed to be important. 25 The BBA may also have believed benchmark rigging to be infeasible and therefore false submissions as purposeless, but its evident disinterest may have been inevitable given the conflict inherent in a trade association policing the conduct of certain elite members. ibid., at Ev.10, and see supra text accompanying nn.13-4. 25 See infra text accompanying n.64-6, and see n.82. 28 Ibid., at 3, 'bidding above Libor' implying actual borrowing being costlier than the bank's submission. 29 See Gyntelberg & Wooldridge, op. cit. n.19 at 65, identifying incentives for such behaviour:
Anomalies in US dollar
Most fixings […] are based on non-binding quotes; contributing banks are not obliged to transact at the interest rates they submit. Therefore, the reliability of such fixings as measures of market conditions depends on the willingness of contributing banks to reveal their true, transactable quotes.
[…] There may be circumstances in which contributing banks deliberately choose to disclose biased quotes. If there is uncertainty about the liquidity position of a contributing bank, the bank will be wary of revealing any information that might add to this uncertainty for fear of increasing its borrowing costs. Therefore, for the purposes of the fixing, the bank has an incentive to quote a lower interest rate publicly than it might be prepared to pay in a private transaction.
ibid., reference omitted from original. A contemporary estimate of the result for three month US dollar Libor was that the published rate understated true Eurocurrency borrowing costs by 20-30 bp, and for reasons similar to Gyntelberg & Wooldridge:
[…] the prevailing fear of being perceived as a weak hand in this fragile market environment.
[…] Because all LIBOR postings are publicly disclosed, any bank posting a high LIBOR level runs the risk of being perceived as needing funding. governed by rules put in place to prevent collusion', 44 implying that collusion occurred to circumvent those rules, and accordingly remanded the case to the district court for consideration of those other claims not linked to the question here at issue.
Libor appears as a reference in many contracts, and although it was at the time concerned (and at all times previously) a subjectively-determined indicator, its manipulation would be contrary to US law if shown to be collusive, that is, subject to an agreement made among submitting banks. On the facts known, it is respectfully suggested that the Second Circuit mis-stated the intention and substance of the 'Libor-setting rules'. 45 No other court has taken a similar view and the precedents cited by the Second Circuit concerned benchmark conduct wholly different from the Libor process. The court noted that the Libor rules included a requirement for submitting banks to provide opinions in good faith and it has been stated in UK appellate proceedings that a failure to do so was 'potentially dishonest', 46 but collusion among submitting banks was not substantiated in the claim made at first instance in re Libor-Based Financial
Instruments Antitrust Litigation and nothing was presented to the court to indicate that each submitting bank did anything but act alone and in accordance with its perceived self-interest.
The rules summarised by the Second Circuit were supposedly a record of contemporary practices adopted by the BBA with the express intention of ensuring the competitiveness of its Libor process, these summaries taken directly from material contained in the plaintiffs' amended complaint of 10 September 2013. This inter alia misinterprets verbal and electronic exchanges among traders and brokers contained in published settlements and regulatory orders -all of which originated with individuals in connection with misconduct for reward -as providing evidence of banks colluding to influence the benchmarking process for strategic reasons. 47 It is submitted to the contrary that only one BBA 'rule' of the three stated in the complaint may be correctly described as such; the others were descriptions of BBA operational guidance rather than demands made of submitters, and there is no available evidence to show 44 US sellers of Libor-referencing instruments could have contractually specified actual rates based on market activity. Instead they adopted a benchmark that while representative in normal conditions was at all times fictional. Scholars of US competition law have identified certain benchmark misconduct as illegal due to the Sherman Act's prohibition of price-fixing, 50 for example, that 'standard-setting is an elimination of informational competition' and therefore contrary to US law, 51 a suggestion that first, fails to distinguish between standard-setting and price reporting; second, mischaracterises the BBA's Libor process as both cooperative (which it was) and provided with rules to prevent collusion (which it was not), the breach of which constituted collusion and would make the process illegal in US law. The Sherman Act requires that colluding parties have made an agreement in some meaningful manner, 52 so that merely 
Locating Libor
What became the BBA's Libor in 1986 evolved from well-accepted provisions developed in syndicated Eurocurrency loan and securities contracts. 54 The BBA invited submissions from nominated panels of banks using similar language to those contracts, then processing and publishing the results as adjusted simple averages of the panellists' rates. 55 Libor was named from commercial habit rather than locational reasons, for the process described in the terms of floating rate loans or securities referred to interbank deposits available to a specific bank at a fixed time in London, and the result known colloquially as Libor some years before its adoption by the BBA. 56 Submissions were typically sourced from several centres even if reported to the BBA by a London clerk, 57 and later misconduct enforcement actions were accordingly begun 54 Euromarket practice in 1981-5 was that English and many New York law syndicated loan contracts typically referred to periodic interest rates as adjusted averages of those given to a transaction agent by a defined group of banks, being the rate at which each expected to be able to borrow in the interbank market at 1100 hours, London time, for a set period from a specified date, see supra nn.5-8 and accompanying text. 55 At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?
see Wheatley op. cit. n.11 at 61. Until 1998 the question had been substantively identical but more plainly subjective:
At what rate do you think inter-bank term deposits will be offered by one prime bank to another prime bank for a reasonable market size today at 11am?
ibid., emphasis added. The earlier version of the question was taken by the BBA from contemporary contractual drafting and was also adopted in 1998 by Euribor's collator. 56 London was cited to provide a uniform submission time given that banks sourced rates from many time zones, and did so during seasonal daylight saving time that began and ended in different jurisdictions on non-congruous dates. 'London' avoided ambiguity and the need for conditional terms, and appeared in contracts prior to 'Libor' becoming a widely-known acronym, see I. through provisions for periodic rate-setting was certainly innovative, as was the recognition in the early-1980s that standardising contractual terms was essential for fairness and to encourage Société Générale had the Bank submitted honest estimates of its borrowing rates, which rates were publicized through the LIBOR rate setting process.
ibid., at s.14. 58 See Enrich, op. cit. n.55 at 306. 59 Inter-dealer broking firms have fallen in number since 2008-09 due to consolidation and a functional migration to electronic platforms encouraged by the adoption of FSB and IOSCO recommendations on dealing transparency and record-keeping, without a disproportionate effect on substantive activity in any single hub. 60 Despite any apparent 'loss of trust', see Wheatley, op. cit. n.11 at 7, although altering benchmark specifications is more quickly implemented than changing contractual references to any single benchmark, and may be unnecessary if contracts or exchange rules provide for alternative calculations when a benchmark is unavailable or suspect. Wheatley's report led inter alia to the BBA's replacement as Libor compiler, and the cessation of the least plausible components of the Libor family, that is, those for long periods in shallow markets. Its findings were endorsed by the FSB and IOSCO in respect of four major currency benchmarks and six others, and followed by regulators elsewhere, see Financial Stability Board, Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks (22 July 2014), 4, available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140722.pdf (accessed 3 January 2018). Progress is slow in specifying 'true' benchmarks to replace Libor and Euribor, arguably one indication of why a subjective model was first adopted, see supra text accompanying n.9. 61 'Although LIBOR is calculated in London, it is based on daily submissions from a number of international banks and is used as a benchmark globally', see Wheatley, op. cit. n.11 at 76. 69 The contention here is that such claims are misplaced, both in identifying an uncultivated process as generating actionable reputational capital due to the projection of soft power, and in assuming that this brought benefits to finance in the UK, 70 or indeed that Sibor was of similar value to Singapore, for example. The BBA's labelling Libor as 'the world's most important number' not only belied a failure to ensure its integrity but neglected that Libor's ubiquity resulted from certain markets developing more comprehensively in the UK than elsewhere, not something with intrinsic value.
Trust in finance
No analysis of benchmark misconduct can neglect the post-crisis hostility towards global finance associated with a sudden awareness of wrongdoing, recklessness or inadequate supervision, 71 conclusions shared by prominent enquiries. 72 Seen as a loss of trust, any continuing enmity may have implications for dealings among intermediaries and financial centre activity, 73 trust being synonymous with exchange transactions and relational dealings among professional parties in organised markets that require participants to have viable expectations of the conduct of those with whom they contract.
As the principal instigator in legal scholarship of the relational theory of contract, Ian Macneil saw trust as synonymous with 'social solidarity' or 'a state of minds' among parties to an exchange, 74 the presence of which renders that exchange feasible by making each party sufficiently confident of the other's actions, a view derived from his conception of contracting as a societal construct facilitating exchange. 75 Trust signifies expectations as to the behaviour of parties within a social system, including any established commercial setting, 76 and is distinguished within developed financial systems from the assessment of creditworthiness because that process is always subjective, 
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While cultural failure is associated not with 'broad civilizations' but:
[…] often found in enclaves or silos within which narrower political, institutional, professional or commercial cultures or subcultures prevent or prohibit control, or limit discussion and communication, for example by imposing rigid hierarchical structures, by creating and maintaining firewalls, or by imposing excessive or unintelligent forms of control, or be requirements for secrecy. 79 An equivocal description, indicating both the value of self-generated rules and the risks associated with their abuse. 80 One example is the Tokyo trader convicted of conspiracy to defraud by attempting to influence Libor for his own purposes, who claimed to have been unaware of engaging in misconduct, a cultural relativism in taking silence or lack of attention as a signal that his actions were tacitly supported or condoned. 81 The trial also revealed cultural failure in benchmark collation, with the BBA's nominal 'Libor manager' failing to see any significance in its neglect of responsibility. 82 Trust for O'Neill and Macneil is thus based on a shared understanding of behavioural norms. 83 If for the financial sector it implies a capacity and willingness to cooperate, then would the collapse of exogenous trust -the trust in finance of others -erode the favourable externalities associated with professional clustering in financial centres, 84 or would material harm follow a collapse of trust within finance among professional intermediaries, for example if it involves expectations of a failure to follow generally-accepted rules? 85 Could continuing popular enmity lead to political demands for restrictions on cooperation and reciprocity among financial actors as unacceptable forms of collusion, despite there being no reliable evidence of banks colluding in misconduct? 86 A post-crisis decline in trust among financial sector participants has been shown as short-lived and limited in effect. 87 Evidence is equally sparse of commercial results with similar implications from a fall in trust in the entrenched institutions of the financial sector, whether in law, regulation or commercial practices. 88 Benchmarks that were subject to misconduct have not suffered observable losses of use except during a general hiatus in transactional activity after 2007, albeit that their popularity also indicates little trust in alternatives. 89 Popular disenchantment may be fierce and continuing but its probable impact largely confined to prompting secondary legislative initiatives, for example to heighten supervision or compliance guidelines. Whether a fall in external trust has influenced commercial conduct among intermediaries is accordingly nebulous, for conduct is more likely to respond to changes in law or regulation, even as indirect reactions to public discontent. 90 A further consequence of FSBled reforms is a proliferation of detailed sectoral codes of conduct, the breach of which can be made contrary to law through secondary rule-making, 91 and which has been the preferred formula for misconduct enforcement actions since mid-2012.
This is not to characterise a loss of trust in finance as having no material or deleterious implications, the span of which was described expansively by the FSB's chair while misconduct revelations were appearing, 92 nor to ignore evidence of an individual propensity among those professionally engaged in finance to tolerate or engage in misconduct. 93 Perhaps as a result the FSB and IOSCO are promoting and helping to draft sectoral codes of conduct to which regulated intermediaries will be required to follow or adopt formally as internal practices, even though there may merely augment existing legal sanctions for misconduct. Albeit with few convictions for benchmark misconduct or fraud as comparators, 94 the failure of other criminal actions in the UK, US and elsewhere suggests difficulties in locating reliable evidence rather than inadequacies of law, which codes of conduct and additional compliance resources may eventually mitigate, although at a considerable cost:
By pursuing a set of rules requiring ethical compliance, international financial regulators appear to believe that there cross-border architecture has the capability of being robust, but only if it is paired with an industry populated by people inclined towards compliance. Creating ethical bankers across the globe is therefore the softest sort of softball regulation, but it illustrates the critical role of, at least as regulators see it, constructing attitudes towards compliance as a real component for semi-legal obligation. 95 The implication being that compliance staff are paid to enforce ethical conduct that their revenue-seeking colleagues are prone to neglect, or which cannot always be identified.
By requiring banks to act ethically, according to similar principles that all bankers are meant to uphold, one of the consequences of regulation by ethics is the creation of a modest enforcement mechanism, without resorting to a dispute resolution process, or tribunal, which can be politically complicated and if it takes a treaty, almost impossible to implement. , although the meaning of the latter is not explained. 93 Behavioural experiments sought to test the honesty of 128 bankers with an average of 11.5 years' experience by having those individuals complete simple tasks in either their professional capacity or (as an experimental control) or personal guises found evidence that:
The core intention of adopting expansive codes of conduct may be to clarify and highlight what constitutes misconduct, and create scope for offenses for breaches of conduct rules by empowering financial regulators. 97 Compared to existing practice this approach risks denying the means to correct or compensate for future regulatory failure.
Conclusions
Available evidence shows that Euribor and Libor submissions were subject in 2005-10 to unethical conduct by individuals that in some instances was illegal or contrary to law; to an indifferent unawareness among senior bank executives that resulted from the submission process having always been treated as a cost-consuming function; that collusion in misconduct between banks has not been shown to have taken place; that no substantive locational nexus existed in the period concerned between the Libor process and misconduct occurring in London compared to elsewhere; and that while general trust in the financial sector was certainly damaged inter alia by Libor misconduct, trust among intermediaries was not materially affected in terms of reciprocity in their commercial dealings. 98 Freely-available interest rate benchmarks using Libor's panel model were created as a response to disutilities in the customary but more private contractual model developed in the Eurocurrency credit markets. That migration is acknowledged as providing a trusted foundational metric for financial derivatives, as well as ready and even-handed access to rate fixings for all interested parties and observers. Current reforms instigated by the FSB and IOSCO that largely adopt the Wheatley recommendations are intended to restore external confidence by substituting recorded transaction data for subjective estimates, but in some respects neglect the faults that led to the mid-1980s shift. It is acknowledged by regulators that a complete switch to using transactional data will be difficult to implement, despite the accepted aim of replacing a flawed model, and the concern therefore exists that the reforms found most feasible will be more likely to recreate the disutility that interest benchmarks were created to remove. Wheatley's analysis was detailed but its recommendations limited to a high-level sketch -replace the fictional for the real -rather than a workable solution, and it is suggested with respect that this partly reflects the background of the figure from whom the study takes its eponymous title, in organised exchanges and securities regulation. Wheatley may have encouraged an unnecessarily hasty conclusion without regard for the practicalities of its adoption, while the use of commercial data and profit-seeking collators are certain to lead to the results becoming less freely available than at present, to the detriment of many users.
